



The Report of Governor Bill Owens'

COLUMBINE REVIEW COMMISSION

Hon. William H. Erickson, Chairman

MAY 2001

STATE OF COLORADO



May 2001

Bill Owens
Governor

Dear Fellow Coloradan,

On April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School southwest of Denver murdered 12 fellow students and one teacher in the worst school shooting in U.S. history. The Columbine tragedy forever changed the way Americans think about the potential for violence in our schools. No one can erase the horror of that day, or restore the losses suffered by the victims and their families. Yet only by learning from Columbine can we hope to prevent similar tragedies in the future.

On January 28, 2000, I signed an executive order creating the Columbine Review Commission, to conduct an independent review of the tragedy that occurred on April 20, 1999. I appointed the distinguished William H. Erickson, former Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, to chair the commission. The commission's volunteer members spent over a year conducting public hearings and examining thousands of pages of documents before compiling their findings and recommendations.

The full report follows. The report is also posted on the state's website at: <http://www.state.co.us>.

To the members of the commission I extend a heartfelt thanks for the many hours devoted to this difficult task. They have provided a great public service, and we are deeply grateful.

Sincerely,

Bill Owens
Governor of Colorado



THE GOVERNOR'S COLUMBINE REVIEW COMMISSION

Commission members pictured here are:

1st row, l. to r.: Troy Eid, Sheriff George Epp, Raymond T. Slaughter, Hon. William H. Erickson, Pamela Jo Suckla, Professor William T. Pizzi.

2nd row: Donald S. Quick, Professor B. James George, C. Suzanne Mencer, Timothy M. Tymkovich.

3rd row: Stephen D. Vercelloni, Stanley T. Paprocki, Ruben E. Archuleta, Bill Ritter, Jr., and Dr. Robert F. Wintersmith.

(Commission members not pictured: Robert N. Miller, Dr. William J. Moloney, Gale Norton, Dr. John B. Peper, and Aristedes W. Zavaras.)

THE GOVERNOR'S COLUMBINE REVIEW COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 28, 2000, Governor Bill Owens created by executive order a Columbine Review Commission to inquire into the Columbine High School tragedy on April 20, 1999, and to submit recommendations on several matters: (1) law enforcement handling of the crisis; (2) the sufficiency of safety protocols as used at Columbine High School; (3) an evaluation of emergency medical response and evacuation techniques employed at Columbine; (4) the appropriateness of victim assistance efforts at the scene; (5) identification of key factors that might have contributed to the tragedy and of methods that might prevent similar future occurrences; and (6) an examination of other relevant issues relating to the tragedy.¹

The Columbine High School tragedy was the work of two disgruntled seniors at the school, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, who determined to kill as many teachers and fellow students as possible, first, by planting and detonating two 20-pound propane bombs in the school cafeteria and then by shooting survivors fleeing the

¹The Governor announced the creation of the Commission on September 28, 1999 and appointed its members and staff at that time. With the benefit of their recommendations, the Commission's structure and scope were formalized in the Governor's order of January 28, 2000.

inferno they hoped to create."ⁱⁱ When their explosive devices failed to ignite, the two approached the school and killed one student and seriously wounded a second as they ate their lunches on the grass. They then entered the school building and began firing at students leaving the school cafeteria, wounding five students and deliberately executing one of them.

Klebold entered the school cafeteria briefly but did not fire his weapon inside; he returned outside the building and fired at students near the school parking lot, wounding one of them seriously. Meanwhile, a number of students, two school custodians, and at least one teacher fled to the cafeteria from which, in turn, many either fled from the building or climbed stairs to the second-story library; one teacher and a student were wounded when Harris fired a rifle at them through the school's double glass doors. Emergency calls were made to the 911 number, and teachers urged students in the library to take cover under the tables. Klebold and Harris reentered the building and fired at students in the main hallway and hallway outside the library, wounding one. They also detonated or left for later detonation a number of pipe bombs. Encountering a teacher, Dave Sanders, they seriously wounded him with a shotgun blast. Sanders bled to death from his wounds before medical assistance was provided more than three hours afterwards.

ⁱⁱMost components to construct pipe bombs are readily available for purchase at nearly every hardware or sporting goods store. Consequently, controls over purchases by or on behalf of minors would be very difficult to impose and implement.

About 15 minutes into their onslaught, the two entered the library where 56 students, two teachers and two library employees had sought concealment. Within seven-and-a-half minutes, Klebold and Harris killed 10 students and seriously wounded a number of other persons by rifle and shotgun fire; they detonated pipe bombs, although without inflicting severe wounds. Several students were deliberately killed execution-style.

Klebold and Harris fired at police from library windows and received return fire. They left the library and moved to the science wing, where they shot at fleeing students. After returning briefly to the cafeteria, the two perpetrators tried again to explode by gunfire the two propane bombs they had carried earlier into the cafeteria, without success, but managed to detonate smaller bombs, one of which was attached to a container of flammable liquid. The resulting firebomb activated the cafeteria sprinkler system, and soon thereafter the sprinkler and fire alarm systems were activated throughout the school building.

The final moments of the perpetrators' lives have not been clearly tracked. Apparently they moved into the office area on the second floor, and then returned to the cafeteria. A surveillance video camera captured their movements there: they seemed to survey the damage to the cafeteria and police activities in the school parking area. From there they went back to the library and exchanged gunfire from

the library windows with police who were protecting paramedics rescuing students wounded outside the school building. At about 12:08 p.m., or 47 minutes after the two had commenced their assault, the two turned their weapons on themselves and committed suicide, having left behind them a trail of 13 dead (12 students and one teacher) and many wounded persons. Because the response teams outside the school building were unaware of their deaths, it required several more hours before officers could secure the building, obtain medical attention for the wounded, and collect the dead.

Since the Columbine High School event left so many important questions to be answered, questions that would not be answered if the Columbine tragedy were simply relegated to the archives of history, Governor Owens entrusted the Commission with the responsibility to identify the lessons that Columbine taught. It could not bring back to life or physical wholeness any of the victims of Klebold's and Harris's depredations. But the Commission's efforts and the disbursement of state funds would be well expended if even one life could be saved by effective law enforcement and rescue responses to a future emergency like Columbine.

Governor Owens appointed William H. Erickson, retired Colorado Supreme Court Justice, to chair the Commission, and designated ten voting members of the Commission:

Ruben E. Archuleta, retired chief of police for the Pueblo Police Department.

George Epp, Boulder County Sheriff, and a member of Colorado's Peace Officer Standards and Training Board.

C. Suzanne Mencer, a retired FBI agent and the current executive director of the Colorado Department of Public Safety.

Robert N. Miller, head of litigation at the Denver office of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene, & MacRae, formerly district attorney for Weld County and United States Attorney for Colorado from 1981-1988.

Gale A. Norton, who served as a Commission member until she became Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; had been Colorado Attorney General from 1991 to 1999, and was senior counsel at Brownstein, Hyatt & Farber, P.C. at the time of her appointment to the Commission.

Dr. John B. Peper, professor emeritus at the University of Texas at El Paso and chair of the College of Education there before his retirement; he served as superintendent of the Jefferson County School District from 1981 to 1990.

Bill Ritter, Jr., District Attorney for Denver County, and a member of the Colorado Supreme Court's Judicial Advisory Council.

Pamela Jo Suckla, a rancher from Slickrock, Colorado, with service on the Dolores County School Board and the Colorado School Board.

Dr. Robert F. Wintersmith, Director of Research and Education, Colorado Division of Civil Rights; he served earlier as a Director of the Social Services Division, St. Louis, Missouri, Housing Authority.

The ex officio members of the Commission are:

Troy Eid, Chief Counsel to Governor Bill Owens.

Dr. William J. Moloney, Colorado Commissioner of Education and Secretary for the Colorado State Board of Education.

Stanley T. Paprocki, senior consultant for the Colorado Department of Education.

Donald S. Quick, Deputy Attorney General of Colorado for Criminal Justice.

Aristedes W. Zavaras, Manager of Safety for the City and County of Denver; former Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Safety.

The staff members of the Commission are:

Keith C. Coffman, a Denver-based writer and reporter who has covered criminal justice and legal issues for several major national and international news outlets for over 15 years.

Professor B. James George, professor of law emeritus, New York Law School, and minister of pastoral care, First United Methodist Church of Castle Rock, and a reporter for the Commission.

Professor William T. Pizzi, professor of law at the University of Colorado Law School, and reporter for the Commission.

Raymond T. Slaughter, Director of the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice, within the Colorado Department of Public Safety.

Timothy M. Tymkovich, a partner in the law firm of Hale, Hackstaff, Tymkovich & ErkenBrack; he served as Colorado Solicitor General (1991-1996).

Stephen D. Vercelloni, paralegal assistant, Division of Criminal Justice within the Colorado Department of Public Safety.

More complete biographical information on the above-listed persons may be found in Appendix B of the Commission Report.

The Commission conducted 15 meetings open to members of the public.ⁱⁱⁱ Only one meeting, lasting not more than one-and-a-half hours, was closed to the public at the specific request of Jefferson County Sheriff John Stone, who was apprehensive of the possible adverse impact of a public meeting on an ongoing criminal investigation into the Columbine incident; Undersheriff John A. Dunaway and Division Commander John Kiekbusch of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office presented only a brief overview of the events at Columbine. In the course of its public hearings, the Commission questioned experts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office, the Arvada Police Department, the Lakewood Police Department, the Littleton Fire Department as well as many criminal justice experts. However, it was denied the privilege of interviewing Sheriff Stone and his deputies, even though Sheriff Stone had agreed to appear before the Commission on three separate occasions.

Emergency medical relief personnel and staff members from the six hospitals providing treatment for victims of the Columbine assault testified before the Commission and provided it with valuable information on proper procedures for responding to critical emergencies like that at Columbine High School. Testimony was also received from Littleton Fire Department personnel who provided emergency

ⁱⁱⁱA list of witnesses appearing before the Commission may be found as Appendix C of the Commission's Report to the Governor.

medical services at the scene. The training and crisis management engaged in by the medical technicians and hospital personnel were exemplary. Experts also testified concerning the victims assistance programs employed in the aftermath of Columbine; their performance was likewise outstanding.

The Commission's assigned duties were to review the events occurring on April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School and to submit recommendations for preventing or handling similar emergencies should they arise in the future. The Commission anticipated, and in most instances found, that subpoenas were not necessary to the completion of its assignment. With the notable exception of the conduct of Sheriff John Stone and a very few others, which foreclosed the Commission from completing its investigation in depth of the law enforcement response at Columbine High School, law enforcement and response agencies were quite helpful in providing most of the information Sheriff Stone had refused to produce for the Commission.

In sum, the Commission received statements from an extensive list of state and local officials and private persons who had experience with or information concerning the Columbine High School event; its staff reviewed thousands of pages of official and nonofficial documents, reports and studies. Its findings, set out at length below, support a number of recommendations for remedial and preventive measures at all

levels of Colorado's governmental structure, and by the executive and legislative branches of state and local government:

A. *Recommendations Relating to Crisis Response Actions.*

- Law enforcement policy and training should emphasize that the highest priority of law enforcement officers, after arriving at the scene of a crisis, is to stop any ongoing assault. All law enforcement officers who may be first responders at a crisis, and all school resource officers (SROs) should be trained in concepts and skills of rapid emergency deployment, whether or not assigned as members of standing or reserve special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, and should have immediately available all weapons and protective equipment that might be required in a pursuit of active armed perpetrators.
- Because the establishment of an incident command system is an essential component of successful planning for emergencies, implemented by well-conceived and frequent intra- and interagency training programs, the Commission recommends a much-increased emphasis on training in preparation for large-scale emergencies. Designated law enforcement command personnel should be trained to take command at the beginning of a crisis, to control assembled personnel, and to communicate incident objectives clearly to their subordinates.

B. *Recommendations for Improved Communications for Critical Emergencies.*

- Law enforcement agencies should plan their communications systems to facilitate crisis communication with other agencies with whom they might reasonably be expected to interface in emergencies. Because effective radio communications are indispensable to rapid deployment to meet critical incidents, school districts where local police and rescue agencies utilize digital bandwidths for communications should consider the installation of transmission repeaters in larger school buildings to facilitate communications from within those buildings to outside receivers.
- To promote interoperability of communications among agencies responding to a critical emergency, the Commission recommends that Colorado continue to develop a single statewide digital trunked communications system. The Commission also recommends that agencies in parts of the state not yet within the statewide system should receive state funds for the purchase of TRP 1000 or similar systems, enabling at least one of them to be available in the event of a serious catastrophe in any part of the state.

C. *Recommendations for Advance Planning for Critical Emergencies.*

- Appropriate officials in each Colorado County should prepare and keep current a major critical emergency response plan addressing large-scale crises, including those arising at local schools; the appropriate contents of such a plan

should include assessments of public and community response resources, the location and availability of needed resources, and the operational requirements to cope with such emergencies (for example, designation of officers to be in charge of a command post and crime-scene processing, procedures to be followed in evacuating injured persons and in designating medical facilities to which they are to be transported, and assignment of responsibility for extinguishing fires and disposing of incendiary and explosive devices).

- Regular planning sessions should be held, participated in by representatives from federal, county and local law enforcement entities, fire and rescue agencies and local school administrators, to focus on preparations for a range of foreseeable emergencies (including worst-case scenarios), based on the county's critical emergency response plan. Participating officials and agencies should base interagency training and disaster-response rehearsals on the current plan.
- Every school in Colorado should develop an emergency crisis plan tailored to meet the particular safety concerns at that school. In drawing up such a plan, school administrators at each school should solicit advice from local law enforcement and rescue agency personnel. School safety planning likewise should take into account the needs and expected responses to emergencies not

only of students, administrators and faculty, but also of custodial staff, clerical personnel, cafeteria workers, nurses, bus drivers and other school employees.

- School district officials should consider requiring local school administrators to assemble an appropriate number of emergency kits, depending on the size of the school, to include such things as school diagrams with exit routes clearly indicated; information about procedures to shut off alarms, sprinkler systems and utilities within the building; important telephone numbers; and a current school roster. District school officials should review the safety plan for each school in the district to ensure that it is appropriate for that school.
- Because school-based training and preparedness rehearsals are critical components of an effective emergency plan, preparedness requires that key members of each emergency response team know the roles they will be required to play in the event of a crisis and that they practice or rehearse those roles. Each school should schedule crisis drills at least once a year, and preferably once each school term. It is desirable to include police and rescue agency personnel in preparing for scenarios in which those agencies would likely be involved.

D. *Recommendations Bearing on Interaction with Media Representatives.*

- Because substantial media coverage of major critical emergencies is to be expected, each major response agency should designate a public information

officer of command rank, experienced and trained for the role, who will respond promptly to notice that a major critical incident is in progress at which personnel of his or her response agency are present. The official in charge at an incident command center should designate a principal public information officer if two or more such officers arrive together at the center; otherwise, the first-arriving public information officer should serve as the official liaison with media personnel at the scene.

- Police, fire and rescue agencies, hospitals and victim support agencies, as part of their planning for serious future crises, should prepare themselves to cope with a spate of media attention that probably will become manifest well before a crisis has ended. It would be well to include media representatives in that planning process.

E. Recommendations Concerning Tasks of School Resource Officers (SROs).

- The primary tasks of SROs are to enforce the law and to protect the public safety. SROs and school authorities alike must understand clearly that SROs are law enforcement officers and, as such, should normally be in uniform whenever assigned to a school. SROs should be trained like other first-responders in rapid deployment tactics in case of a school emergency. If SROs are to ensure the safety of persons within a school, school administrators should provide them with all relevant information about students at the

school, unless the information is privileged by law. Police command officials should transmit to SROs all information relevant to school safety, including reported criminal conduct on the part of students at the school.

F. *Recommendations Concerning Detection by School Administrators of Potential Perpetrators of School-Based Violence and Administrative Countermeasures.*

- School officials should continue to work to change the "code of silence" dimension of the prevailing student culture, by emphasizing to students that loyalty to fellow students has its limits, one of which is that statements or conduct carrying with it a possible threat of violence, even an indirect threat, must be reported to school authorities. Students, teachers, administrators and parents also must be reminded that many perpetrators of school violence are quite young. Therefore, threats of violence must not be discounted because a student issuing a threat is young. School authorities should make it quite clear to students and their parents that all threats of violence, whether of violence to others or to the person making the threat, and whether direct or indirect, will be taken seriously and evaluated. Students and their parents should be brought to understand that threats of violence are never appropriate even as jokes, and may well have consequences for students who utter them. If a threat relates to a specific person, it should not matter that the person toward

whom the threat was directed does not wish the matter pursued; it should be evaluated like any other threat.

- Each school district should establish a mechanism like an anonymous telephone line, through which students and others may anonymously report statements or conduct that worries them. The Commission endorses the efforts of the Colorado Attorney General and others to develop a statewide hotline number that students and others can use to report threats and other forms of behavior that concern them. Whatever the mechanism for anonymous reporting eventually established in a school district, it is important that students learn of it and be advised of its importance to their safety and the security of school premises.
- All schools in the state should adopt one or more of the bullying-prevention programs that have already been tested and proven effective. Every school administration should adopt a code of behavior that sets forth clearly the rights and responsibilities of both students and adults within the school community, and should ensure that its code is enforced equably against all violators. Because it is difficult for administrators in large schools to create a supportive atmosphere for students, if fiscal and other concerns do not allow for the continuation of smaller schools, communities should explore the use of alternative approaches in larger facilities like schools-within-a-school.

- A state task force should be created to develop model threat-assessment plans, standards and training programs.
- A threat assessment team should be established at every Colorado high school and middle school, responsible for evaluating threats of violence reported by students, teachers, school staff or law enforcement personnel. All reports of verbal and written threats, "hit lists," or other indicia of future violence should be taken seriously by a team. Each team should include a school staff member like a counselor or a vice-principal who knows the students and the student culture at the school, and who is able to gather information at the school useful in assessing each threat. It is desirable, if feasible, to appoint to each threat assessment team a trained mental health professional, for example, a school psychologist, and someone with a background in law enforcement. Members of each threat assessment team should receive training on such matters as threat assessment, suicide prevention and the law relating to student confidentiality. To ensure that a threat assessment team acquires all information needed to evaluate threats, each school should be expected to maintain accurate records about earlier threats and crime incidents there. Every school should adopt an effective violence prevention program that meet the needs of that school, including both in-school programs and community-based programs, to which students and their families can be referred.

- All agencies that possess specific information regarding threatening behavior of a juvenile, the potential for violent behavior by a juvenile or other delinquent acts of a juvenile, should share that information with other agencies dealing with that juvenile, to the extent allowed by law. Agencies that deal with juveniles, including law enforcement, courts, probation, schools, social services, and mental health agencies, should familiarize themselves with the Colorado juvenile information exchange laws in order to understand what is required under the law. Those agencies should then work to implement protocols to ensure a full and timely exchange of appropriate information regarding juveniles.
- Although security devices can effectively deter certain forms of school crimes, including theft, graffiti, and gang violence, they have not yet been proven to be cost-effective in preventing major school violence like that experienced at Columbine High School. Therefore, the Commission does not recommend the universal installation of metal detectors, video surveillance cameras and other security equipment as a means of forestalling school violence generally; for the present, such security devices can serve only to offer transient solutions to specific problems at individual schools.

G. *Recommendations Concerning Medical Treatment for Attack Victims.*

- Medical facilities in a given area should consider the advisability and feasibility of instituting an intranet system among hospital emergency and critical care units, not only to assist trauma centers in the course of major emergencies, but to promote efficiencies in the routine diversion of patients from one hospital trauma center to another.
- One technique for resolving time gaps between a SWAT team entry and the arrival of EMTs is to include one or more EMTs in SWAT teams so that emergency medical help arrives as a component of each SWAT team. An alternative solution is for one or more members of each SWAT team to be trained in emergency medical procedures and to carry emergency medical equipment with them. Therefore, SWAT teams should include one or more members with emergency medical training to reduce or minimize the time interval between a SWAT team's arrival and primary treatment of injured victims.

H. *Recommendations Concerning Reuniting Attack Victims and Their Families.*

- Command centers at the sites of large-scale emergencies with many victims should include a victim advocate at the command center so that accurate information can be provided more directly to the families and friends of

victims. Adequate provision for staff support and stress debriefing should be a part of each responding agency's planning for a major crisis.

- Families of victims of major emergencies should be assigned to victim advocates whose offices or residences are nearby where they live.

I. Recommendations Concerning Identification of Victims' Bodies and Family Access to Bodies.

- In acknowledgment of the human anguish created by occurrences like that at Columbine High School, the procedures for victim identification appropriate to most emergencies perhaps ought to be relaxed to accommodate the immediate emotional needs of victims and their families.

J. Recommendations Concerning Suicide Prevention in the Aftermath of Incidents Like Columbine.

- Because suicide constitutes a very serious public health problem in Colorado, and is an observable phenomenon in the aftermath of incidents like Columbine, programs should be developed and implemented to enable teachers and school administrators to discuss with students the subject of suicide before it occurs and not exclusively afterwards. In particular, faculty and staff at Colorado's schools need to be conversant with the common

warning signs for suicide and the appropriate responses and nonresponses to them when observed.

In conclusion, April 20, 1999 memorializes a tragic and lethal school assault that resulted in the deaths of 12 students and a teacher and the wounding of 24 other students who encountered Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris before they turned their own weapons on themselves and took their own lives. The sole purpose motivating the assailants' acts was to kill as many students and teachers as they could before ending their own lives.

The Commission hopes that the recommendations embodied in its report will provide methods of avoiding another Columbine and of more effective responses to such assaults should they occur in the future.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part I	Formation of the Commission	1
Part II	The Commission's Evaluation of Law Enforcement and Emergency Response to the Assault at Columbine High School	5
A.	Investigative Obstructions Encountered by the Commission	5
B.	The Demographics of Columbine High School	9
C.	Responses and Investigative Aftermath to the Columbine Incident	10
D.	Problems Encountered in Meeting the Columbine Crisis	13
Part III	Backgrounds of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold; Their Preparations for the Columbine Assault	17
A.	Family Backgrounds	17
B.	Social Attitudes	18
C.	Available Data Indicating Dangerousness	19
D.	Encounters with the Jefferson County Juvenile Justice System	20
E.	Harris's and Klebold's Preparations of an Arsenal	22
Part IV	Chronology of the Columbine Incident	25
A.	The Initial Actions of Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris at Columbine High School	25
B.	Carnage in the Library	29
C.	Initial Arrival of Jefferson County Officers	34
D.	Denver Police SWAT Unit Reports Exchange of Gunfire	38
E.	Jefferson County SWAT Team Arrives and Makes a First Entry into School's East Side	41
F.	The Aborted Entry into the West Side of the School and the Rescue of Richard Castaldo	42
G.	Command Post Actions; SWAT and Tactical Operations of Other Police Agencies	44
H.	Setting a Perimeter; Reports of a Hostage-Taking Situation	46
I.	SWAT Team Entry Into the Lower Level of the School's West Side	49
J.	SWAT Teams Sweep Upper Level of School and Locate Dave Sanders in a Science Room	52
K.	Discovery of Wounded Survivors in the Library	54
L.	Medical and Rescue Response	57
M.	Victims and Their Families at Leewood Elementary School	58

Part V	Lessons from Columbine: The Changing Role of "First Responders"	59
A.	Introduction	59
B.	Police Response at Columbine	59
C.	How Columbine "Broke the Mold" for Police Emergencies	63
D.	The Impact of Columbine on Law Enforcement Strategy and Training	66
E.	Equipment for First Responders	68
F.	Improving Communications From Inside Public Schools and Other Buildings	69
Part VI	Lessons from Columbine: Preparing for Critical Emergencies	73
A.	Introduction	73
B.	Resources for Advance Planning for Critical Emergencies	74
C.	The Importance of Multi-Agency Planning and Training for Critical Emergencies	77
D.	The Importance of Incident Command Structures During Major Crises	79
E.	The "Interoperability Problem" Affecting Police and Rescue Agencies during Major Emergencies	82
	(1) An Overview of the Problems	82
	(2) Aggravation of the Interoperability Problem During Large-Scale Emergencies	83
	(3) Improving Inter-Agency Communications in the Wake of Columbine	84
F.	A Final Coordination Problem in the Course of School Emergencies: The Uncertain Relationship Between School Administrators and Police Agencies	86
Part VII	Lessons from Columbine: Preventing School Violence	91
A.	Introduction	91
B.	Knowledge About the Perpetrators Before the Columbine Attack	91
C.	Knowledge Possessed by the Parents of the Perpetrators and Other Students	92
D.	The Importance of "Leakage" About Impending Acts of Violence	93
E.	The Reasons Students Fail to Come Forward Even Though Worried About Violence	94
	(1) The Code of Silence	94
	(2) Youthfulness of Perpetrators of School Violence	95
F.	The Relationship Between Bullying and School Violence	98
G.	Three Models for Addressing School Violence	102
	(1) The Safe Communities-Safe Schools Model	102
	(2) The John Nicoletti Model: "Violence Goes to School"	104
	(3) The FBI Approach to Threats of School Violence	106
H.	The Importance of Evaluating Threats	106

I.	The Need for School Administrators and Law Enforcement Agencies to Share Information	108
Part VIII	Lessons from Columbine: Protecting Children At School	111
A.	Introduction	111
B.	The Safety Protocols in Effect at Columbine High School	112
C.	The Core Content of a Valid School Crisis Plan	113
D.	"Target Hardening" as a Technique to Promote Safety in Schools	117
Part IX	Lessons from Columbine: Victims	123
A.	Introduction	123
B.	Medical Treatment for Attack Victims	124
(1)	Triage Sites at the Scene and Hospital Treatment of Victims	124
(2)	Hospitals, Victims and the Media	126
(3)	Problems in Treating Wounded Victims at the Scene	127
C.	Reuniting Students with Their Families	128
(1)	Difficulties Faced in the Process	128
(2)	Delays in Making Positive Identification and Permitting Family Access to Bodies of Dead Victims at Columbine	130
D.	Support for Victims in the Aftermath of Columbine	132
(1)	Public Monies for Victims' Support	132
(2)	The Healing Fund	133
(3)	Other Private Financial Assistance and Other Donations to Victims	134
E.	Understanding the Lengthy Processes of Recovery	135
F.	Suicide Prevention	135
Part X	Conclusion	139
Appendix A	Governor Owens' Executive Orders	141
Appendix B	Commission Membership and Staff	149
Appendix C	Listing of Witnesses Appearing Before the Commission	162
Appendix D	Bibliography for Report Parts V-IX	166
Appendix E	TIME Magazine Articles on Columbine	174